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I. INTRODUCTION
The attributes of the proposed space station program
are specifically oriented toward research activities. On
the other hand, the ultimate goal of research is to develop
technologies which can generate long term benefits for man-
kind. In our society, unless such technologies are deemed
of national interest and thus are government funded, they
must stand on their own in the marketplace. Therefore, the
objectives of a United States space station should be based
on "commercial" criteria; otherwise, such a project will not
attract long term funding. The reality of this conclusion
should be evident in these times when budgets will continue
to be affected by lingering deficits.
At this point, there is encouraging evidence that some
potential space station activities could be generating reve-
nues from shuttle related projects within the decade.
Specifically, the McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson
electrophoresis prototype pharmaceutical processing experi-
ments show significant promise. Other materials processing
concepts as well as remote sensing, as documented by Terra-
Mar's analysis for the TRW space station study, indicate
substantial potential. Furthermore, the economics and thus
the commercial feasibility of such projects will be improved
by the operating efficiencies available with an ongoing
space station program.
Thus, by the end of the decade, there may be several
applications which will seek the services provided by or
associated with a space station. That possibility can and
should dictate the direction of current space station de-
velopment. A future space station can generate a substan-
tial proportion of its own funding on the basis of its
commercial potential. This potential must be defined and
documented in a format that will be well received by the
investment community. In addition, each component of space
station activity which has commercial potential must be
matched with the appropriate financial vehicle available
from the investment community. Wall Street is not a mono-
lithic source of capital, and NASA must do its homework to
appreciate the opportunities for private financing that a
sophisticated investment banker, broker, or institution can
provide.
This study will investigate the alternative methods
available to NASA to finance the commercial component of its
proposed space station. This analysis -will be done in the
context of Terra-Mar's previous research into the markets
for remote sensing data and services and the financing
concepts available for funding the next generation of
orbiting remote sensing devices.
II. BACKGROUND
The space station as it is presently conceived may be
quite different from its ultimate configuration in space.
However, one thing is certain -- the space station will be
an expensive undertaking. If NASA utilizes government
financing (in other words, tax dollars), funding will be
accomplished through the normal negotiations that are assoc-
iated with obtaining money from Congress. On the other
hand, if the space program takes on a commercial orienta-
tion, then it will be necessary to approach sources of
private capital with a reasonable knowledge of their opera-
ting procedures and mechanisms. The latter are considerably
different from those associated with Congressional funding.
The following analysis will describe in lay terms the
process and procedures utilized by the investment community
in funding desirable commercial enterprises. However, it
should be recognized that investors are guided by one funda-
mental principle. They would like to get their money back
in a reasonable amount of time with some compensation for
the risks incurred and/or they would like to see sufficient
growth in the fruits of their investment so they will con-
tinue to be secure in the knowledge that their dollars are
well placed. Furthermore, they would like to see managers
using their funds in an efficient and "lean" operation.
Investors are generally extremely sensitive to time delays
or deviations from proposed budgets. Although there may be
some tintilation and indeed ego fulfillment associated with
seeing one's investment floating in orbit, when it comes
down to making decisions, the "bottom line" will almost
always be the dominant factor. In this situation, NASA will
be given no more or less consideration than a bright-eyed
entrepreneur walking in off the street with a new idea. In
fact, considering that the entire pool of venture capital
within the United States is approximately $5 billion, even
enthusiastic pronouncements regarding the benefits of a $10
billion space station may not be well received by the
investment community.
Given this situation, NASA will have to learn the
language and procedures of the financial services community
and perhaps assume a little humility along the way. The
space station will be composed of many elements, some of
which may fall into the commercial category and may be
financed from private sources. However, as with Congress,
it will be necessary for NASA officials to approach sources
of capital knowing full well the requirements and the cor-
rect protocol. An awareness of the psychological as well as
financial aspects of raising capital will be necessary.
III. ELEMENTS OF RISK: TECHNOLOGICAL, FINANCIAL, AND
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES
The financial community has some basic guidelines by
which it evaluates all potential investments. The perpetual
question is — what are the risks involved in financing the
project? These risks could take the form of technical,
financial, or political uncertainties. First, as far as a
space station type investment is concerned, technical risks
would be those associated with the operation of the facility
as specified or as required to generate revenues.
Second, financial risks would be those associated with
the required funding and revenues of the project in ques-
tion. In other words, can the device be built within budget
and on schedule and will it generate the projected revenues
over its lifetime?
The third element of risk is in the political domain but
indirectly relates to the first two elements. Specifically,
will a government sponsored space station continue to main-
tain its priority in the government budget cycle through
changes in administration and congressional constituencies?
Therefore, if I am an investor in this project that depends
on a government supported system, I want to know if I risk
finding that space station turned off someday due to lack of
interest or due to changes in priority among political
constituencies in the government.
In general, structuring a financial deal is a process
of juggling the elements of risk and reward over time.
Whatever NASA can do to minimize the risks and maximize the
returns over the shortest period of time will increase the
level of interest on the part of the financial community.
However, within the two extremes of a low risk, high return
opportunity and a project with high risk and negligible
return, where the bulk of investment situations lie, the
mode of financing depends upon the "perceived" level of risk
as compared to expected rate of return. Thus, an investor
in treasury bills (usually considered a safe investment)
expects a return only slightly greater than his passbook
savings account, while an investor in a new company pro-
ducing a new product for a new market expects a substantial-
ly larger return based on the anticipated level of risk
associated with the project.
In addition to the factors of risk, reward, and time,
there is the size of the investment to consider. Two pro-
jects with comparable risk-reward ratios will still be han-
dled quite differently if one project requires $5 million
and the other requires $500 million. At first glance, it is
natural to assume that any project associated with a space
station will be a "megabuck" proposition. On the other
hand, to a great extent the use of a space station for
manufacturing and materials processing, as an example, will
involve new and innovative concepts that may more rapidly
emerge from a small group of entrepreneurial engineers
rather than from a major corporation. Such small initia-
tives with such great potential will start with limited
funding, low ground-based overhead, and lots of enthusiasm.
If NASA is truly committed to space commercialization
in the future, its role may be to create a space processing
"incubator" assuming it can relate to the venture capital
elements of the financial community accordingly. At the
same time, the "incubator" may cost several hundred million
dollars to engineer and fabricate and thus NASA may also
choose to deal with that segment of the financial community,
(i.e., institutional lenders) that handles large investments
(oil refineries and pipelines, for example) in an appro-
priate investment framework.
In bridging the range of investment possibilities, the
remainder this report will concentrate on three major mechan-
isms for business financing and on variations and combina-
tions of the three methods where appropriate. These finan-
cing methods include venture capital, R & D limited partner-
ships, and project financing. Each method is appropriate
under different conditions and circumstances; however,
considering the breadth of possibilities encompassed by
these three techniques, there are relatively few viable
business concepts that could not be financed by one alone
or by a combination of the three.
IV. FINANCING METHODS
Venture Capital
Venture capital is a subset of equity financing -- in
other words, financing involved with selling shares in the
ownership of a company among indi"iduals who may or may not
be directly associated with the company. The majority of
large companies are primarily funded through equity finan-
cing with their shares traded publicly either on one of the
major stock exchanges or on the over-the-counter markets.
The term venture capital is often associated with start-up
companies or with companies that are small and have little
or no operating history. Therefore by definition, there is
greater risk involved with this kind of situation. Add the
element of new technology and there is even more risk to be
considered. On the other hand, the investors involved with
venture capital are generally looking for higher return on
their money and are willing to take calculated chances to
achieve that objective.
The amount of money involved with most venture capital
funding is small by NASA standards. The range is within
$100,000 to $10,000,000 with the bulk of the financing
occurring between $300,000 and $1,000,000. In this context,
why should NASA be concerned with venture capital? As
mentioned previously, new commercial technology is most
frequently spawned in the venture capital environment. For
example, the personal computer industry started in a garage
in the Silicon Valley area of California in 1976 and now
represents a $6 billion industry growing in excess of 50%
annually. To a great extent, space commercialization will
require the creation of product concepts which do not exist
today. Large corporations will definitely be involved in
this process, as are McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson
in the current electrophoresis project on the shuttle. But
based on recent past experience, it is more likely that new
companies will respond to the challenge faster than large
established companies. Facing competition from the up-
starts, the large companies will then very rapidly respond
to the challenge -- case in point, IBM's reponse to the
personal computer market in 1981 after denying its existence
in 1978.
Given a viable new product or service, the objective of
the venture capitalist is to assist the new company through
the risky early years of development and growth in anticipa-
tion of taking the company "public", the point when capital
is raised through a public offering of stock. At this
juncture, the value of the company is recognized in the
price of the stock. Additionally, because the stock is
widely traded at this point, the initial investors have
significantly greater flexibility and latitude in "cashing
in" their investment.
However, up to the point of going public, requirements
for additional eguity capital fall on the backs of the
original venture capital group which must either insert
additional funds to protect the viability of their initial
investment or seek additional investment funds from other
venture capital groups, thus diluting their share of the
company. When such injections of capital are predictable
and according to the business plan, then everyone is happy
and content that the company is growing and progressing as
planned. Also, if growth and potential profitability are
ahead of schedule, the need for additional funds is not
begrudged. It is the unexpected "negative cash flows" that
make venture capital investors nervous. Outside influences
of particular concern include unpredictable supplies of raw
material and changing requirements for unique facilities and
transportation, problems not unfamiliar to NASA.
In order to overcome this obstacle, NASA must be able
to sign a contract which specifies the exact availability of
facilities and the cost of those facilities to be used over
a specified period of time. NASA, and thus the government,
must be held liable for any delays that could affect com-
mercial production schedules to the extent that short term
sales revenues are lost and the viability of the company is
jeopardized. Without such assurance, no sensible busi-
nessman would commit time or money to the space station
program.
How can NASA best position its space station program
for venture capital investment? Most immediately, by con-
tinuing the "joint endeavor" process while turning agree-
ments around in weeks instead of months. In a similar
manner, NASA must be prepared to provide space services
rapidly and at a reasonable price to an investment community
that cannot tolerate bureaucratic delays and that works on a
very short, tight schedule with a limited budget. If a new
venture calls for a 1990 space station facility at a $5
million annual lease rate, a "technical" or "budget" problem
that delays the availability of that space station until
1992 and results in an annual lease rate of $10 million will
not be tolerated.
Assuming that NASA can respond to this challenge, NASA
must, in addition, sell its space station programs to entre-
preneurs and venture capital sources in a manner responsive
to their need for facilities. Will a new start company be
interested in buying "up-front" a complete facilities module
at $200 million? Unlikely. Will they rent or lease space
starting at $200,000 per month if they can sell the result-
ing product for $400,000? There is a strong possibility. At
this point, the pertinent questions are:
• can NASA fund the building of appropriate hardware
and charge out its usage at an acceptable level
so that it can recover its costs?
• if NASA cannot or chooses not to perform this func-
tion, are there other entities within the private
sector who would willingly perform this function?
• if there are such "third party" opportunities, can
NASA in turn respond to their needs?
The second and third questions above will be addressed
later in this report. But an important point to make now is
that all forms of commercial financing are tied together by
common threads of self interest. Therefore, on a more
earthly level, a new high technology company will require
manufacturing facilities to do its R & D and to build its
product. Consequently, the company leases office and labo-
ratory space from a real estate investment company that in
turn receives its financing from banks and insurance compa-
nies. Thus, NASA is confronted with not only the priorities
of the venture capital community but also with how these
priorities relate to other financial interests. Similarly,
financial institutions involved with setting up limited
partnerships and structuring project financing for the fab-
rication of space facilities must have commercial tenants
with a viable application in mind. Indeed, a communications
customer may walk in with contracts and commitments in hand.
Yet, organizing and cultivating potential new venture con-
cepts, and specifically their financial supporters, will be
a fundamental requirement for stimulating the long term
development of commercial space activities.
Research and Development Limited Partnerships
As a financial vehicle, the limited partnership has
been around for many years. The concept centers on the
utilization of funding from a group of investors, known as
limited partners, and on the management group, composed of
individuals or a corporation known as the general partner,
all of whom are organized under specific legal and account-
ing guidelines. The primary objective of a limited partner-
ship is to provide off balance sheet financing — in other
words, funding not affecting the credit status of the
company -- while providing specific tax and income benefits
to an otherwise unaffiliated group of investors. Specifi-
cally, the investors receive the immediate tax benefits
associated with the purchase of hardware and equipment with
the additional commitment to receive a specified percentage
of revenues from the resulting project over a predetermined
period of time. The company presumably does not need or
want the tax benefits, avoids the use of debt financing or
equity financing, and is not required to indefinitely share
the profits of a specific project or the long term prosperi-
ty of the company with the investors/limited partners.
In the past ten years, a variation of the standard
limited partnership has evolved which provides specific
benefits to those companies developing new high technology
products. Known as the R & D limited partnership, it is
designed to complement rather than replace conventional
equity and bank financing. The R & D partnership is par-
ticularly beneficial in that it is designed to efficiently
utilize available tax benefits to minimize an investor's
after tax capital at risk and thus substantially boost the
after tax returns. Furthermore, if the research project
proves to be successful, the royalties may be taxed at the
long term capital gain rates. Consequently, these tax bene-
fits enable an investor to take financial risks which would
otherwise be unacceptable to venture capital as well as
conventional equity investors.
The benefits provided by the R & D partnership are
based on three major elements of the tax code and related
legal decisions. First, the Internal Revenue Code, Section
174, permits an electing taxpayer to currently deduct quali-
fying research expenditures rather than capitalize them as
part of a product's ultimate cost. Second, the tax code
permits the partners to be taxed at the long term capital
gains rates on the sale of all rights tc? a patent or patent-
able property by the inventor or a person who buys an inter-
est in the invention from the inventor before it is commer-
cially exploitable, regardless of the actual holding period.
The third element is the decision made by the U.S. Supreme
Court in a precedent setting case known as "Snow vs. Commis-
sioner", 416 U.S. 500 (1974) which held that limited part-
ners could offset their income with partnership research or
experimental expenditures. This decision also further ex-
tended the boundaries of Section 174 to include businesses
that have not yet offered any product for sale.
For example, a typical partnership would be initiated
by an inventor, who as general partner would contribute his
invention or idea while the limited partners provide capital
to finance the required research and development to bring
the concept to fruition. The partnership subsequently
spends the funds for research allocating the resulting tax
loss to the limited partners. This loss offsets the limited
partners "nonpartnership" taxable income therefore reducing
their after tax exposure and thus reducing the perceived
risk of the research project. When the concept is perfected
and brought to the marketplace, the general and limited
partners share the income generated from the sales of the
product.
Over the last ten years, many variations to this basic
structure have been suggested and tested within the business
community. In most cases, the partnership contracts out the
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R & D to a research corporation, usually headed by the
inventor. This procedure takes advantage of existing facil-
ities, minimizing the requirement for the partnership to
invest in new facilities while protecting the "trade se-
crets" of the inventor. Similarly, rather than manufactur-
ing and selling the results of the research effort, the
partnership will sell all rights to the invention to the
research corporation/inventor in exchange for royalties
based on sales. These royalties usually represent a sig-
nificant proportion of revenues until the limited investors
are paid back for their initial investment. At that point,
the royalties decrease to a subtantially smaller percentage
which, by contract agreement, usually terminate after a
specified period of time. In this manner, the inventor
maintains control of his company and his technology based
products while minimizing external debt. The limited
partner/investor minimizes his risk through the tax benefits
while obtaining the prospect of above average returns on his
dollar if the product is successfully developed. This pros-
pect is particularly enhanced by the stipulation that tax on
the royalties will be paid at capital gains rates rather
than ordinary income rates.
Although the concept described for creating an R & D
partnership is seemingly simple and straightforward, there
are legal and accounting pitfalls which can jeopardize the
integrity of such a project. Lawyers and accountants tend
to get rich in the process, but their advice, gathered from
other's experience, will be required in structuring an
agreement which meets the requirements of all participating
groups including the IRS.
NASA may not immediately appreciate the significance of
the R & D partnership in financing the commercial elements
of a space station. However, it should be realized that
most R & D partnerships stress the development more than the
research. In other words, where capital is required to test
the feasibility of manufacturing a product or creating a
process for manufacturing in space, the R & D partnership
may represent an appropriate mechanism for achieving that
objective. Again, it should be realized that such financing
usually would not stand alone. Somewhere in the process of
funding a new business, venture capital will be involved as
well as those elements of financing required to fabricate
the manufacturing facilities, which for NASA's purposes,
would be modules of a space station.
Therefore, in covering the attributes of venture capi-
tal and the R & D partnership, the basis for using these
financing tools for funding the most promising commercial
space activities has been established. The methods for
financing the components of the space station will be ad-
dressed in an overview of project financing.
Project Financing
Project financing is another relatively simple concept
that is utilized by the business community to finance
large, capital-intensive projects while minimizing the im-
pact to the sponsor's balance sheet. The basis of project
financing lies in the ability to confine the financing to a
particular business unit or "project" without recourse to
the sponsor. Thus, the project should stand by itself as a
viable business concept or have access to specified third
party guarantees which will ensure the project's ability to
repay its lenders.
Project financing has been successfully utilized by
companies involved in the transportation and processsing of
new energy resources in particular. The amount of money and
the time required to build such facilities frequently places
an intolerable burden on a single sponsor unless the risks
and rewards can be spread among several other interested
parties. Such groups could include insurance companies,
upstream suppliers, and downstream customers, as well as the
lending institutions themselves. Collectively, the inter-
ests of all parties are achieved, usually through intense
negotiations and compromise, and the credit viability of the
project is established based on the combined qualifications
and commitments of its constituents.
Although simple in concept, project financings can be-
come quite complex when the often conflicting goals and
requirements of its constituents are considered. Again, the
experience of other companies, both their successes and
failures, can be beneficial in determining whether project
financing would be appropriate for a particular application
and in determining how best to minimize delays in completing
the transaction.
Criteria for Implementation
As stated previously, project financings generally are
associated with capital intensive business concepts that
have a lifetime of significant duration. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider various criteria for project financing
in the context of the project phase in which these criteria
are applicable.
For practical purposes, almost all projects can be
divided into four distinct phases: planning, engineering
and construction, start-up, and operation. The sponsor of
the project will initially produce a business plan which
will outline in detail the anticipated costs to be incurred,
revenues, and milestones for the proposed project. In the
case of a space station, the dollar amounts and time periods
may vary, but the sequence of events will be the same. Thus
during the planning period before implementation of project
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financing for a component of a space station, the following
criteria will be carefully scrutinized by lenders who wish
to minimize their exposure:
Is the primary sponsor adequately backed by
equity funding? (Banks and other lending in-
stitutions are not financially backed or or-
ganizationally prepared to take equity
risks. )
Are the projections for costs and revenues
conservative and based on valid assumptions?
Is there technology risk? In other words,
are there components of the project which
are technically unproven and potentially
unreliable?
Are components and raw materials readily
available and reliably priced?
Is transportation for raw material and
finished product available and competitively
priced and will it remain so for the lifetime
of the project?
Does a market exist for the finished product?
If so, is it a mature or immature market that is
growing, static, or relatively unpenetrated?
Is there a threat of technological
obsolescence?
Is the contractor or any intermediary agency
considered reliable, cost conscious, and noted
for delivering according to contract schedule?
Are the management personnel experienced?
Have they operated similar projects under
comparable conditions and what was their track
record?
Is there sufficient insurance to cover losses
beyond the control of the operators?
Is the project going to operate in a stable
political environment? In other words, will
all types of regulation be anticpated, will
all forms of taxation be discounted, and will
changes associated with fluctuations in
government be minimal?
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Leasing
Although debt of some type is present in almost all
forms of project financing, various forms of leasing repre-
sent an important mechanism for facilitating the flexibility
required in capital-intensive project funding. The basic or
true lease provides the lessor the opportunity to claim the
tax benefits associated with equipment acquisition which he
flows through to the lessee in reduced lease payments. The
lessee, who might otherwise be unable to take advantage of
the tax benefits, thus is able to reduce'his cost of finan-
cing his business. In a pure sense, the lease is a form of
project financing. In a broader sense, the lease is a
component of larger, long term equipment acquisition which
has become known as project financing in the evolving use of
that term.
Leasing typically appears in a project financing in the
form of a "leveraged" lease. In this variation, the lessor
borrows from 50% to 80% of the funds required to purchase
the desired equipment from a long term lender such as a bank
or institutional investor. At this point, the simple lease
becomes somewhat more complex now that a third party is
involved. The debt is secured by a first lien on the equip-
ment purchased and an interest rate is negotiated based on
the credit-worthiness of the borrower and the perceived
risk of the transaction. The lessor is permitted to claim
all the tax benefits of the equipment purchase which will
initially reduce any negative cash flow from the transaction
even though interest must be paid to the lender. In the
short term, the lessee also benefits due to reduced lease
rates.' Assuming that the use of the equipment progresses as
planned, the reduced negative cash flow in the short term
will accelerate growth and development of the business to a
point where a positive cash flow is achieved at a faster
rate. Leveraging also increases the risk asociated with
unanticipated losses -- that is, leverage can work in both
directions.
In leveraged lease transactions of any significance,
there may be a large number of lenders and owners. Thus,
frequently, an owner trustee is established to hold title to
the equipment and to represent the owners while an indenture
trustee is named to oversee the interests of the lenders by
holding the mortgages and monitoring the periodic flow of
funds. The complexity of such transactions and the result-
ing legal costs usually limit their use to projects invol-
ving major equipment . Hardware for a space station opera-
tion would most certainly fall into this category.
Factors that could enhance or expedite the formation of
project financing transactions would include government
guaranteed debt (i.e., revenue bonds, guaranteed bank debt,
etc.) and/or investment tax credit and accelerated deprecia-
tion for technology investment. In particular, this is an
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area where NASA and the Congress can play the most effective
role by providing incentives for the investment community to
become involved with space commercialization. New technolo-
gy areas are always slow to attract investment dollars until
one or another factor triggers the interest and awart-nebb of
investors. Positive publicity is a very important contribu-
tion. In that sense, space commercialization is receiving
favorable coverage by the press. However, the public per-
ceives that space activities are expensive and risky and
prone to undefined time delays. Economic incentives would
go a long way towards changing that image and putting space
commencialization into a positive investment environment.
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V. SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION: REMOTE SENSING AS A CASE
STUDY
Satellite remote sensing, as typified by the Landsat
series of satellites, has been utilized and scrutinized for
more than a decade. And yet, within the government, very
little has been done to understand the commercial potential
of satellite remote sensing or to determine how it could be
commercialized productively and efficiently. Landsat has
been primarily an R & D program with heavy emphasis on the
"R" and with only minor attention paid to the commercial
"D". Unfortunately, this has left a very promising commer-
cial technology with a very poor foundation for transition
to private sector operations. Even the major aerospace
contractors, who have been involved with the Landsat pro-
gram, have a poor understanding of the business opportuni-
ties in this field. From their point of view, satellite
remote sensing was only important to them in terms of gover-
nment contracts and not in terms of developing a new market
for earth resources information services.
The government, through the NASA Landsat and the NOAA
meteorological satellite (Metsat) programs, has contributed
significantly to the future economic potential of satellite
remote sensing. In spite of this contribution, however, an
unfortunate lack of understanding has developed concerning
the context in which remote sensing fits into a commercial
environment. In NASA's sphere of operation, remote sensing
is primarily an aerospace technology. But in the commercial
world, remote sensing is a computer and information technol-
ogy and it should be packaged and marketed accordingly.
Of greater significance, however, is the fact that
remote sensing has not been positioned by the government as
a potential commercial technology; therefore, it has re-
mained unnoticed by the financial community. Specifically,
no government agency has ever conducted market research to
define the true potential of an information system based on
real-time data acquisition from a network of geosynchronous
and low earth orbiting satellites. To a great extent,
knowledgeable private sector groups understand that the
potential gross revenues derived from all components of an
earth (land and ocean) resources and environmental data
industry can be numbered not in the millions, but in the
billions of dollars annually.
This past underestimation of the commercial potential
of satellite remote sensing certainly does not help NASA now
when promoting remote sensing as a component of a commercial
space station program. Estimates by TRW in their Space
Station Needs, Attributes and Architectural Options Study
(SSNAAO) indicate that the contribution of the space segment
(namely, the sensors and platforms) of remote sensing to
overall space station revenues could be as much as $5.15
billion between 1995 and 2000. However, this contribution
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to the support of the space station program is highly depen-
dent on aggressive development of the satellite data user
market at this time, paralled by a dedicated commitment to
developing a commercially viable follow-on to the Landsat
program.
The government's past attitude towards remote sensing
may be attributed to its orientation toward research rather
than business in space. There is also a seemingly "govern-
mental" quality to the meteorological satellite observation
process. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the current
activities of the Landsat program will be transferred to the
private sector within the next several years with other
application functions (i.e., ocean and meteorological remote
sensing) being assumed by private companies during the lat-
ter part of this decade as a function of a gradual transi-
tion to commercial operations.
Terra-Mar recognizes that future revenue from appro-
priate satellite sensors is directly tied to growth asso-
ciated with the next generation of computer services. In
this context, digital satellite imagery will be a valuable
source of input into earth resources information services.
Within the private sector, the infrastructure for this ser-
vice capability is now in the development stage. Highly
refined applications software for converting imagery into
information will soon greatly expand the current limited
user base. Furthermore, computer networks and distributed
processing will provide convenient access to new markets for
specialized earth resources data bases. This is a factual
not a speculative scenario that is based on generally accep-
ted trends which are fundamental to all computer service
companies.
In building investor confidence in the commercial po-
tential of remote sensing, it is essential to establish the
connection between these trends and the commercial oppor-
tunities that accurate information generated from satellite
imagery will provide. Assessing and analyzing the market
becomes an important function of capitalizing a new indus-
try.
Assessing the Potential Market
Previous government studies have at best defined the
value of satellite remote sensing in terms of a "cost-
benefit" analysis using techniques inappropriate for asses-
sing future high-technology markets. Specifically, the
mechanism for gathering information about the future user
community — the market survey — has misrepresented the
substantial potential of an earth and environmental resour-
ces information industry. The market survey can be a very
useful tool in predicting sales figures, depending upon how
the information is gathered and how it is utilized. In the
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case of past surveys of users of remote sensing data, the
general questions have been along the lines of "...how would
you use remote sensing data", "... how much remote sensing
data would you buy", and "...how much are you willing to pay
for remote sensing data". The absurdity of such questions
can be put into some perspective if one considers how a
"potential customer" for computers or plain paper copiers
would have answered similar questions in 1950. Most people
cannot even begin to imagine how remote sensing data could
relate to the way they do business or to how they make
decisions.
In order to correctly assess the potential market for
remote sensing "information" — that is, highly processed
and refined remote sensing data -- one must ask questions
which relate to how people use any type of earth resource
information in their business and how critical this informa-
tion is to their decision making process. This type of
information could be as seemingly mundane as a newsletter
from the state fish and game department or the morning
weather, livestock, and commodities report on the local
television news. It could also be as expensive and complex
as a $100,000 per year crop forecasting service received
daily by a commodities brokerage business. Each use of
information is extremely significant for the forecasting of
the market for remote sensing derived products. Even this
market research is irrelevant if put into a market forecast-
ing model which does not account for the real world environ-
ment. In the case of forecasting remote sensing information
markets, models which do not include industry concentration
(revenues per establishment), user sophistication (ability
to utilize and adapt to computer generated products), and
technology leverage (growth of computer generated services )
should be considered useful to the academic economist but
otherwise useless in a commercial environment.
Unfortunately, such an incorrect market analysis has
been generated in past market forecasts from current sales
of Landsat data from the EROS Sioux Falls Data Center.
Sales of products from an R & D system in a format not
readily interpreted by the "masses" does not constitute the
basis for accurate market projections.
In evaluating market potential, Terra-Mar has assessed
the gross requirements of users for all forms of renewable
and nonrenewable resource and environmental information in
terms of operating revenues which are specifically affected
by the availability of that information. Thus, an oil
company managing a $100 million offshore oil field may spend
$500,000 per year for wave, current, and meteorological
information derived from satellite data and associated
value-added services. Or, 10,000 commodity brokers may each
utilize $50 worth of a commodities information service in
making trades equaling $50,000,000.
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Based upon the availability of appropriate remote sen-
sing data, earth resources and environmental information
services will eventually penetrate and expand these current
markets with improved products. Projecting the growth and
development of such a business becomes a function of quanti-
fying the size of that potential market and then calculating
rates of market penetration based on historically documented
algorithms for comparable technologies (namely, those based
on computer and communications technology) .
Terra-Mar's market projections derived from analyzing
these marketing and technological trends provide a positive
basis for pursuing commercial satellite remote sensing ser-
vices. These projections assume an aggressive marketing
environment -- one that is unregulated and very competitive.
Similar promising revenue estimates for materials processing
products and services have been made outside the government.
NASA must recognize that the technologies, which are par-
tially the fruit of NASA's own R & D efforts, must be nur-
tured in an environment stimulated by the application of
creative marketing techniques. The creation of the technol-
ogy establishes the potential of a new business. Applica-
tion of sound marketing and management techniques makes that
potential business a reality.
The Leverage of Improving Technology
To a great extent, growth in the markets for earth
resources and environmental information will be made pos-
sible by advances in semiconductor and computer technology.
The growth in the sales of personal computers from zero in
1976 to over $6 billion in 1983 is indicative of a trend
towards less expensive, distributed computing which will
shape the marketing strategies for computer services in the
future. In essence, the personal computer has created a
mass market for software and data services on an individual
level. Like the scientific hand-held calculater of the last
decade, a high percentage of scientists, engineers, and
businessmen will own a desktop personal computer to use in
their day-to-day decision making process. It will not be a
luxury but a necessity.
In this marketing context, remote sensing data will
become an important component of the future information
revolution. Terra-Mar has determined that a substantial
proportion of important decisions made by the business com-
munity are related to having accurate information about the
earth's resources or its environment. Improving the raw
satellite imagery with value-added services -- essentially,
customizing the data to user needs — will make remote
sensing data a strategic element of the future decision
making process of international business.
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In addition to advances in computer technology, the
next decade will see improvements in the methods of deploy-
ing orbiting earth sensors. More reliable, interchangeable,
and thus less expensive sensor components will be operated
from space platforms such as the Fairchild Leasecraft and
the MBB SPAS in coordination with manned space stations. On
these platforms, scheduled maintenance and repair will pre-
vent the costly loss of satellite sensor systems, as pre-
viously experienced with Seasat, for example. The require-
ment of efficiency and economy will replace the "gold-
plated" specifications generated by the previous era of
R & D sensors.
Approaching the Investment Community
Unfortunately, the investment community has not been
well informed about the commercial opportunities regarding
utilization of remote sensing technology. Government offi-
cials have not only failed to educate Wall Street but have
also failed to understand how private investors can play an
important role in developing this strategic technology. As
mentioned previously, investors are guided by certain cri-
teria in evaluating prospects for placing their funds.
Four criteria are particularly applicable in the case
of remote sensing. First, is the technology far enough
removed from research and development that there is small
risk of technical surprise along the path to the market-
place? Second, is this a market with substantial opportun-
ity for long term growth? Third, after considering develop-
ment and operating costs, are revenue projections sufficient
to provide adequate return-on-investment (ROI) in comparison
with other investment opportunities? And fourth, is there
minimal near and long term risk of the type of government
regulation that could inhibit earnings growth? In other
words, are we dealing with a politically benign technology?
Ten years of successful R & D in Landsat and related
environmental satellite programs will provide the basis for
initiating commercial remote sensing ventures with little
threat of technical uncertainties or unknowns. Solid state
sensor technology will minimize many of the risks of mechan-
ical sensors, while improved modes of deployment such as
SPAS and Leasecraft serviced through a manned space station
can minimize the risks of on-orbit failure.
Discounting the government evaluation of remote sensing
generated information markets, private studies such as those
prepared by Terra-Mar adequately document the potential of a
market for products and services primarily generated from
the availability of appropriate remote sensing data. Par-
alleling other computer generated information service mar-
kets, this business should generate approximately $12 bil-
lion in revenues (in constant 1980 dollars) from sales of
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data, computer hardware and software, and value-added ser-
vices by the year 2000. Such rapidly growing and sustained
market opportunities are currently highly valued by the
investment community.
Thus, the projections for revenues and profits become
equally appealing as costs decrease with improved computer
and sensor technology, while progress along the "learning
curve" creates well defined methods for decreasing unit cost
for data generation. Subsequently, remote sensing will
follow the trend of other computer technologies as near term
dominance of hardware sales is rapidly displaced by require-
ments for software and then raw data, as the market becomes
more broad-based and sophisticated in its utilization of
available products.
This leaves the fourth factor -- the issue of politics
— as the remaining unknown and the single issue which could
inhibit commercial development of remote sensing products
and services. The current controversy over the disposition
of Landsat 4 and the environmental satellites poses a ser-
ious problem for the business community to overcome. Speci-
fically, Landsat 4 and the Metsats are encumbered with
technical and political problems which make their transfer
to the private sector rather complex. The original value of
the satellite and related data processing assets is signifi-
cant; however, on the open market, that level of technology
is considered obsolete. Given the computer technology which
is available today and which will make another substantial
leap by 1984, Landsat 4/Metsat-type equipment, primarily
oriented for R & D applications, could be considered in
financial circles to be a commercial liability. There is
also a negative stigma associated with "Landsat" as a com-
mercial concept. The entire process of "analysis" has poli-
ticized Landsat to the extent that the financial community
views Landsat with a certain skepticism -- it is expensive,
unreliable, and may entail unknown political traps.
Nevertheless, Landsat 4 and the Metsats do represent a
significant contribution to our understanding of the tech-
nology associated with developing viable commercial informa-
tion products. The addition of the Thematic Mapper to
Landsat 4 has provided new insights into the potential
usefulness of satellite resource surveillance. However,
Landsat 4 is not configured to be an operational satellite
system, and no investor who is seeking to compete in an open
marketplace would consider owning that system. The NOAA and
GOES environmental satellites, although existing in an oper-
ational environment, are similarly not configured for com-
mercial utilization. The government's preoccupation with
"selling" Landsat and NOAA satellites has missed the true
objective of promoting satellite remote sensing as a viable
commercial technology. Emphasis should be placed on crea-
ting incentives for investment in the next generation of
reliable and efficient satellite sensing systems, rather
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than on unloading the product of past R & D programs. Simi-
lar errors cannot be made in developing commercial space
station programs, otherwise investors will show little in-
terest in these programs.
The proper government orientation and strategy should
be to stimulate the groundswell of value-added activity
which is already occurring, thereby increasing revenues from
satellite data sales as new applications become entrenched
in the marketplace. Strength among private sector operators
will eventually permit backward integration into data re-
ceipt and archiving as well as the development and operation
of orbiting sensors. In this mode, healthy competition will
encourage the creation of new applications software as well
as encourage the companies with the best capabilities to
assume a leadership role in developing a fully integrated
earth resources information system.
In this frame of reference, the investment community
can properly interact with those private companies, objec-
tively evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of various
competing concepts, evaluating their management's strategic
planning skills and knowledge of the market, and putting
each to the ultimate test -- looking at the "bottom line".
The government should not compete with Wall Street in making
these decisions. The government's self-interest, as probab-
ly the largest single customer for earth resources informa-
tion services, will be best served by letting the market-
place determine which companies are best qualified to own
and operate remote sensing satellite systems. A similar
approach would expedite and enhance the investment potential
of other commercial space activities.
Creating an Investment Model for Commercial Remote Sensing
Assuming a creative and stimulative transition of sat-
ellite remote sensing from current government operation, a
remote sensing/earth resources information industry can
finance its space segment using many of the techniques and
tools outlined in Section IV. A further assumption must be
made that the cost of remote sensing systems will decrease
substantially during the next decade as improved electronics
are incorporated into operational sensing platforms. As
discussed previously, this capability will be further im-
proved by the ability of sensing platforms to be serviced on
orbit by astronauts from a manned space station. Changes in
the competition and cost structure within the aerospace
industry will also lead to the availability of space quali-
fied components at prices approaching those for aircraft
avionics. Within this structure, multiple sensor "platform"
systems will be feasible under project financing guidelines.
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VI. SPACE STATION MODULAR FINANCING
Various circumstances may evolve which will dictate the
design and operating priorities for space station develop-
ment. Assuming that commercial applications become a sig-
nificant factor in the planning process, a strategy must be
implemented that will accomodate differing requirements for
orbiting facilities by various commercial users. Besides
being sound from an engineering point of view, this strategy
must also be financially viable. Ideally, early commercial
users of an orbiting space station will pave the way for
other users. For example, every new technology market has
its identifiable source of market leverage. In this situa-
tion, communications provides that source of leverage. Or,
in the parlance of corporate America, telecommunications
could be the "cash cow" of space commercialization and could
provide the core facilities to support commercial remote
sensing and materials processing projects.
Commonality and interchangeability of hardware will
become a key criterion not only for operational convenience
but also to minimize fabrication costs and consequently
investment risk. Investors will be favorably inclined
towards facilities where the risks associated with engineer-
ing and fabrication are borne by a number of users. "Cus-
tom" facilities have the aura of high cost and unknown
operating history. Those risks are commonly taken for
granted by NASA but are to be avoided if possible when
presenting projects for financing to the investment
community. If engineering risks are to be part of any
project, they should be "packaged" as part of an appropriate
financial vehicle -- namely, venture capital or R & D lim-
ited partnerships.
In that sense, for financing reasons the space station
should be engineered in a modular framework that is both
functional and practical. Individual projects planned for
the separate space station modules (or components), and
their operating facilities, can then be matched with the
financing mechanism best suited for the element of risk and
the return on investment associated with that project. In
reviewing the space station feasibility studies prepared
over the last decade, Terra-Mar has concluded that an appro-
priate concept reflecting this logical, modular approach is
embodied in the "Manned Orbital Systems Concepts Study"
(MOSCS) prepared by McDonnell Douglas for NASA in 1975.
Vestiges of this philosophy can be found within the reports
completed earlier this year in response to the SSNAAO,
although there appears to be an inclination to engineer a
facility on a more elaborate scale. The reader is referred
to the MOSCS Executive Summary for a review of a conceptual
approach to a commercial space station which, if repackaged
for Wall Street today, would probably be favorably received.
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VII. SPACE STATION INVESTMENT SCENARIO
There are many possible variations on how and under
what conditions the investment community would participate
in some component of commercial space station financing.
For illustrative purposes, this section contains an invest-
ment scenario in which the previously discussed financing
techniques are interwoven into a deal reflecting the priori-
ties of investors as they relate to an actual opportunity.
In this analysis, all individuals and companies are ficti-
tious and the circumstances do not represent current or
proposed ventures of any kind.
Tom Evans
Fred Dexter
Roger Barrett
Pete Baxter
Phillip Donley
Bob Lambert
Gary Hansen
Ted Lambert
Al Pearson
Cast of Characters
- Senior Chemical Engineer at
Consolidated Electronics Industries
- Tom Evans1 boss
- Fred Dexter's boss and
V.P. of Engineering at
Consolidated Electronics Industries
- Tom's brother-in-law and
an investment tax lawyer with
Kroger, Michaels & Cresap
- President of Aerospace Devices,
parent company of Space Facilities Inc
- Board member of Aerospace Devices and
retired bank executive
- Board member of Aerospace Devices and
former president of Crosby Steel
- Bob's brother and a partner at
Kroger, Michaels & Cresap
- Pete Baxter's tennis doubles partner
and a partner in Advanced Technology
Concepts
Tom Evans is a senior chemical engineer at Consolidated
Electronics Industries in Lake Pleasant, New York. He has
worked for Consolidated for twenty-five years and now heads
their semiconductor crystal fabrication laboratory which
synthesizes and tests various materials used in semiconduc-
tor fabrication. An aerospace buff for many years, Tom has
been intrigued by the possibility of growing pure crystals
of gallium arsenide in microgravity. He knows that NASA is
building a space station where migrogravity experimentation
time will be available at a reasonable cost for R & D and
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feasibility studies. Thus inspired, he took some of his own
time over a three-month period to develop the chemical
analysis, engineering fabrication plans, and the business
plan for a gallium arsenide crystal growing project which he
subsequently presented to his bot>s, Fred Dexter, for review.
Fred was impressed, put his stamp of approval on the pro-
ject, and referred it up the chain of command to the V.P. of
Engineering, Roger Barrett.
Consolidated Electronics, for reference purposes, is a
$10 billion conglomerate with investments in everything from
aerospace to agribusiness. Forty percent of its annual
revenues is derived from government contracts, primarily
with the Department of Defense. However, 1986 was not a
good year for Consolidated. Hit hard by the unexpected
recession, Consolidated got caught with "fat" inventories
when contracts were cancelled and anticipated orders did not
arrive. In fact, its defense business was the only factor
which kept Consolidated in the black for the fiscal year.
Roger Barrett considers these facts as he reviews Tom
Evan's proposed project. Roger is also only three years
from retirement and is being considered for promotion to
Senior Vice President during the next annual review. He
decides that he does not want to give the impression to the
boys at the top that he is experiencing early senility by
advocating any "Buck Roger" ideas in this economic climate.
Therefore, he places his REJECT stamp on Tom's proposal and
passes it back down to Fred Dexter.
Tom Evans is very disappointed. He thinks out loud,
"what a great opportunity for Consolidated to utilize their
experience in semiconductor R & D and to get a leg up on
their competition. But those guys at the top must know what
they're doing -- they really have the big picture."
By chance, Tom tells his story to his brother-in-law,
Pete Baxter, who is an investment tax lawyer with the New
York investment banking firm of Kroger, Michaels, & Cresap.
Pete is intrigued by Tom's project. Pete knows that Tom is
the best in his field, and he has a feeling that a recent
project in which he was primary legal counsel may be related
in some way to Tom's idea.
K.M. & C. acted as an advisor and broker in a project
sponsored by Space Facilities Inc., a subsidiary of Aero-
space Devices, a $100 million fabricator of specialty elec-
tronics components for NASA and the Department of Defense.
Aerospace Devices' president, Phillip Donley, wanted to
exploit his company's distinctive competence in building
custom aerospace hardware in the new arena of commercial
space operations. Phil had been impressed two years before
at a NASA briefing where the NASA brass really put forth a
well-oiled plan for stimulating commercial space activities.
Phil organized a plan with his chief of engineering to build
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materials processing modules that would be compatible with
the space station design established by NASA.
In essence, it was NASA's innovative approach to this
design that convinced Phil they were really serious about
commercialization. First, they locked in a design within a
year of the SSNAAO studies thus giving everyone outside the
system a chance to evaluate the design and come up with
their own interfacing ideas. Second, the design was a
masterpiece of simplicity -- flexible, taking advantage of
all that was learned in the Skylab and Shuttle programs, and
incorporating the latest advances in computer and electron-
ics technology. For Phil, it was a piece-of-cake to come up
with a compatible design that was equally flexible, using
off-the-shelf technology and their own ingenuity to fabri-
cate a relatively inexpensive module for materials proces-
sing experimentation.
Phil presented the idea to his board of directors. Bob
Lambert, a member of the board and retired bank executive,
was enthusiastic but had some reservations about getting
such a project financed. He told Phil after the board
presentation that Aerospace Devices really needed a customer
for the module or at least a couple companies who were
willing to sign up for long term contracts to rent space on
one or more of the experimentation modules. Gary Hansen,
another board member and former president of Crosby Steel
Corp., had heard that his former company had been doing some
microgravity metal alloy experimentation with NASA Marshall
and offered to see if they were interested in committing
to some long term project. Well, Crosby Steel was quite
cooperative, particularly after realizing that all their
R & D experimentation could be expensed, rather than capi-
talized, based on the 1984 Space Commercialization legisla-
tion that Congress had passed.
Thus, Aerospace Devices received a contingency "take or
pay" contract from Crosby Steel for module rental as well as
a similar contract from the National Science Foundation for
collective university studies. At that point, Aerospace
Devices also established their Space Facilities subsidiary
which sought additional potential large and small customers
through advertisements in various professional journals.
NASA, impressed with Aerospace Devices' concept and their
initiative, expedited the engineering review documents and
enthusiastically gave the materials experimentation modules
their seal of approval.
Then, Bob Lambert stepped back into the picture and got
the wheels turning at K.M.& C. where his brother Ted was a
partner. Ted and Bob put their heads together and decided
that a project financing approach would be the most appro-
priate form of financing for the materials processing mod-
ules. Pete Baxter, Tom Evans brother-in-law, was in charge
of writing the legal opinion for the project financing, in
24
collaboration with Aerospace Devices' counsel, and orches-
trating the final negotiations for a leverage lease with
General Credit Corp. backed by loans from Gotham National
Bank, the lead lender among eight participating banks.
Aerospace Devices could not take advantage of all the tax
write-offs associated with the fabrication of experimenta-
tion modules, particularly the 15% investment tax credit and
accelerated depreciation which was also part of the Space
Commercialization legislation. Thus, the project financing
involved the sale of the modules to General Credit who in
turn leased them to Space Facilities Inc. for resale of
services to their customers. Outer Limits Insurance, Inc.
brokered the insurance covering all risks incurred in trans-
porting and operating the microgravity modules on orbit.
So, all issues of risk, liability, and compensation were
covered by a complex but mutually acceptable project finan-
cing agreement.
In reviewing the project financing documents, Pete
Baxter saw an opportunity for his brother-in-law, Tom Evans.
Space Facilities was offering special incentives for small
experimental users to rent space for 250 hours or more of
their microgravity module time. Tom did not have the money
or even his company's backing but he did have the reputation
and a great concept on paper. Pete called his tennis
doubles partner, Al Pearson, who was a partner in the ven-
ture capital firm of Advanced Technology Concepts, Inc.
(ATC), and arranged a meeting between him and Tom. The
meeting went very well and Fred and his partners decided to
back Tom's gallium arsenide crystal business, to be known as
MicroSpace Devices, with a $1.5 million equity investment --
however, the proof of concept would require up to $6 million
in equipment, processing facility time on the Space Facili-
ties' microgravity module, and transportation costs on the
shuttle. And there was the issue of release of proprietary
ideas from Consolidated Electronics.
Good lawyers and good brokers can solve most problems,
at a price. The REJECT stamp on Tom's proposal was his
ticket to freedom from Consolidated since employers must
either utilize their employees ideas or provide them the
opportunity to develop their ideas on their own, according
to legal precedent. The $6 million issue was settled with
an R & D limited partnership brokered by ATC's parent,
Ferrill Bench, and offered through their 276 offices nation-
wide. With "Space" and "Semiconductor" in the same prospec-
tus title, it was an instant sellout, in spite of all the
boilerplate warnings and disclaimers.
Now, hypothetically, we are in the year 2000 and we are
reviewing the long term fruits of this initiative. Micro-
Space Devices, better known as MSD to the financial communi-
ty, is a $3 billion annual sales company, dominating the
market for ultra fast logic devices, primarily designed for
the MEGAVAX type computer that most people wear on their
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wrist. Aerospace Devices, referred to as ADI, now has
annual sales of a $2.5 billion supplying microgravity manu-
facturing, processing, and habitation modules to their esti-
mated 2500 customers worldwide. They have also just entered
the market for prefabricated hotel modules which they will
initially sell to Hilton International. By the way, NASA
rents hangar and habitation modules from Space Facilities
for their interplanetary exploration vehicles. Collective-
ly, the Gross National Product has been expanded by $100
billion by direct and indirect capitalization expansion due
to space industrialization. And the federal government no
longer has a national debt, in great part due to the addi-
tional tax dollars generated by commercial space develop-
ment .
For review purposes, the foundations of this free
enterprise fantasy may be traced in Figures VII-1 and VII-2
which diagram the ADI project financing and the MSD limited
partnership and venture capital funding.
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Revenue
Exceeding Debt
Service
Figure VII-1: ADI Space Station Module Project Financing,
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VIII. LEASE VS. BUY: NASA HAS A CHOICE
In the previous sections, it was assumed that NASA
would be the prime instigator in establishing a space sta-
tion for commercial or any other purpose. Supposedly, this
would mean that the government would own the space station
and, through NASA, would lease facilities and thus provide
services for a fee. Conceivably, one could ask whether, on
earth, the government should be in the business of building
industrial parks and leasing these facilities to the private
sector. In reality, although the government does own a
large number of the office buildings and laboratories which
it utilizes, it also leases a considerable number of build-
ings from private owners and real estate developers.
It could be argued that a space station is nothing more
than an industrial park in space -- in essence, orbiting
real estate. Should NASA be doing a lease vs. buy analysis
in determining its best utilization of government funds?
Perhaps yes. Is there something so overwhelmingly govern-
mental about space that the private sector should not be
given the opportunity to take the initiative? Perhaps no.
Definitely, the military's requirements for secure facili-
ties may preclude their operation by civilians. If this
factor is an overriding consideration in our future space
programs, then the government should take the lead in devel-
oping appropriate facilities for its own use.
However, if military applications do not represent the
primary reason for being in space, the lease vs. buy deci-
sion should certainly be considered, particularly if the
concept of space commercialization is to be taken seriously.
Why? For the reasons brought up initially in Section II.
Can NASA guarantee its customers continuity of prices and
policy through changes of administration and fluctuations in
the attitude of a Congress that continually revises budget
priorities? It is extremely unlikely. On the other hand,
NASA could lease all or part of a space station from a
private financial institution and expect that contract to
remain in tact through the lifetime of the facility. That
is the reality of law and the art of writing a good con-
tract .
What about the cost? Here, there are tradeoffs that
must be considered. In favor of leasing: deferred vs.
upfront payment, tax revenues generated by leasing profits,
and interest dollars saved if deficit financing is involved.
In favor of buying: elimination of tax deductions assoc-
iated with depreciation and potential revenues gained from
leasing facilities to nongovernment customers. A sensitivi-
ty analysis could be run to analyze the effect of various
tax considerations and interest rates on this type of trade-
off analysis. However, a more appropriate and perhaps less
easily answered question would be -- what levels of effic-
iency and economy could be achieved by an appropriate pri-
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vate space station operator as compared to a government
agency? Would private lenders backing a private space sta-
tion operator impose greater discipline on the contracting
and facilities management process thus promoting more effic-
ient operations? Would the construction and operation of a
private space station be comparable to the manufacture and
operation of airliners -- delivered on schedule for the
contracted amount, operated and maintained according to
strict guidelines motivated by legal, liability, and profit
considerations? Would the economies achieved through busi-
ness and legal discipline reduce NASA's flexibility in ac-
complishing its stated mission, specifically, leading edge
research and development in aerospace applications?
Of course, there is the middle road. The government
through NASA could finance the core facilities -- the solar
panels, docking ports, cooling and radiation devices, and
telemetry facilities -- while the private sector would own
and finance its own manufacturing and processing modules.
To a great extent, the answers to the above questions
go beyond economics and enter the arena of establishing and
perhaps rewriting government policy. However, it should be
realized that the investment community will more readily
interface with a system that it understands and respects,
namely, a system of binding contracts and economic incen-
tives. NASA's commitment to space commercialization may be
judged on the basis of NASA's willingness to play by those
rules. The commitment of private dollars to a commercial
space station project will be impacted accordingly.
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